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1. Background 
 
 
The history of the organisation and management of urban public transport 
systems follows a trend which could be labelled as a 'global model', even though 
it does integrate characteristics specific to each of the countries, and, under the 
current classification, between industrialised countries and developing and 
emerging countries. 
 
In France especially, during the early years of the 20th century, urban transport 
networks consisted in tramway type rail systems which were operated as 
concessions by private operators. The development of automobiles and the 
extension of towns and cities (development of suburban districts) led to a crisis 
in heavy urban transport systems. That crisis was not specific to French cities 
but was felt world-wide. As a result, public authorities (State or local 
communities) tended virtually everywhere to reappropriate the management of 
urban public transport networks, which they operated directly, with extensive 
public financing justified by the public service mission granted to public 
transport. 
 
Despite these interventions by public authorities, public transport was unable to 
withstand the increasing popularity of private cars coupled with the 
consequences of frequently heavy and inefficient public management. In the 
years between 1985 and 1990, the world-wide trend towards market 
liberalisation, the privatisation of utilities, in addition to the global economic 
and financial crisis in developing countries, led to the redefinition of public 
transport policies. This resulted in three major changes in all five continents: 
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• tendency towards decentralisation, with the handing over of management to 
local communities wherever it was yet to be implemented in urban transport 
• opening up of urban services to the private sector (possibly including the 
privatisation of public enterprises / state-owned companies) and creation of a 
competitive environment (Competition and Contractualisation) 
• more sensitive implementation of regulation and deregulation in the transport 
sector (Regulation). 
 
Does the implementation of this model, which is one aspect of the more far 
reaching economic reorganisation trend, ensure the improved efficiency of 
public transport systems, without jeopardising their basic economic and 
social role, and, more essentially, their function in urban structuring and 
environmental protection? 
 
 
Such are, succinctly stated, the terms of the current (or rather, recent) 
debate between the promoters of regulation and a highly active involvement 
by public authorities (as in the French model) based on the role and 
position occupied by the State in the redistribution and defence of public 
service, and those in favour of deregulation and less State intervention to 
leave a free rein to market forces (Anglo-Saxon model, promoted by the 
World Bank). The latter model gave rise to the 'small is beautiful' (small 
operators) and 'competition in and for the market' philosophy. 
 
Based on a number of French examples, as well as on analyses of the situation in 
towns in developing and emerging countries, this proposal goes halfway: it gives 
an increasingly large share to the private sector within a contractual framework 
(regulation), but it also preserves the principle of controlled competition. The 
resulting situation associates the efficiency of private management and the 
public control of the utility: public/ private partnership (P.P.P.). 
 
The financing aspect, which involves shared responsibilities between the public 
and the private sectors, is an expression of that same philosophy. 
 
2. Contractualisation 
 
Utility contractualisation has become a major tendency nowadays. It is 
implemented on varying bases, all of which express identical preoccupations: 
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• Comprehensively define the roles of the conceding authority and of the 
operator respectively: definition of the missions, of financing / price scales, 
commercial and technical risks, rules for respecting the contract, etc., 
• Seek to make the operator's management efficient via the introduction of 
incitements (profit-sharing scheme) and a degree of competition, 
• Grant the operator a contract period that takes into account its level of 
investment. 
 
 
France has created a model of public service delegation which involves 
entrusting a private operator with the management of an urban public 
service. There are several possible types of delegated management, from a 
concession, whereby the concessionaire / operator shoulders construction and 
operation risks, to leasing (investments are the public authority's responsibility), 
or to a management contract for operation exclusively, with an increasingly 
marked involvement by the operator depending on the contracts below: 
• Management contract (sort of state-owned company) 
• Fixed-price contract 
• Contract with financial compensation 
• Own risk contract: operator shoulders the commercial risks; it defines and 
collects the fares, to balance out its operation. 
 
Delegated management of urban services has been well tested in France. It is 
often being quoted as a reference by the World Bank. It differs from 
privatisation by the fact that investments remain the grantor's property, and 
revert to it at the term of the contract. 
 
For the last ten years or so, the construction of public transport networks on 
dedicated sites (of the tramway, metro type) in France and abroad was organised 
as concessions (BOT). In the French cases of concession, the Community 
finances part (which can be a substantial one) of the investment costs. The 
concessionaire enterprise (or grouping) also finances part of the investments (in 
urban transport, the investment fully supported by the concessionaire is a 
textbook case). The operator constructs and operates the transport service in 
exchange for compensation most of which is derived from the fares collected 
from the passengers. The concessionaire enterprise shoulders the construction 
risks and a more or less large share of the operating risks. That type of system 
was implemented in Toulouse, Rouen, Strasbourg, etc. 
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3. Regulation/ competition 
 
Regulation/ Deregulation 
 
The recent experience of liberalisation / deregulation of public transport services 
was a tremendous learning experience on the negative consequences of 
unrestricted market openness without the prior implementation of a new 
institutional framework  and of efficient regulating measures. These negative 
experiences were made in most of the public transport networks in Africa's large 
towns, as well as in certain towns in Algeria, in Morocco and in Latin America 
(for example, Santiago in Chile). In all these cases, there was a proliferation of 
(second hand) minibuses causing traffic jams, pollution, systematically creaming 
off the more profitable lines (to the detriment of the less profitable areas). Worse 
even, these systems had negative consequences on the structuring of space and 
resulted in a dilution of urban spaces turning the more remote districts into 
geographic ghettos. Given the forecast urban growth in major towns in Southern 
countries and increased mobility, it is to be expected that these systems, based 
on a large number of small operators operating in an environment of deadly 
competition, will reach their limit and only increase the gap between the public 
transport offer and the needs. 
 
The main - and virtually universal - lesson to be learnt is that the deregulation of 
urban public transport markets, which aimed to make the system more efficient 
(via competition) and to reduce the financial weight for public communities (by 
resorting to the private sector) only deepened the crisis in the sector, which can 
only get worse. Why is that? 
 
The urban public sector is in very sharp competition with the automobile. They 
share the street space and, in the absence of a priority system, it is penalised by 
competing transport modes. Given its highly capitalistic nature, that sector can 
only balance its activity by applying price scales which are not compatible with 
the resources of the less favoured population. Its economic and social role 
justifies public financing and an organisation which enables it to operate in 
conditions disconnected from the market; Deregulation condemns middle- and 
large-sized organised, professional enterprises, capable of operating high 
capacity installations, rail systems even, whilst complying with social and 
comfort standards. 'Small is beautiful' is sheer utopianism, which leads to the 
negative consequences described above. 
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Now, what type of regulation can be accepted without reverting to 'state' systems 
lacking flexibility and 'grant greedy'. 
 
• Regulation is not incompatible with competition. First and foremost, 
regulation is relevant to the overall environment of the urban transport sector. 
It is the regulating authority's responsibility, to deal with traffic police, urban 
development, local street management and the organisation of urban public 
transport. In France, this cohesive and regulating function is translated in the 
implementation of urban travel plans (Plan de Déplacements urbains - PDU), 
which are mandatory for urban areas with more than 100,000 inhabitants and 
also contain a definition of organisational principles for transport and urban 
development in the middle term. The integration of environmental aspects 
translates in the obligation, for local communities, to promote the least 
polluting transport modes (walking, cycling, public transport) and to limit 
automobile traffic in heavily frequented and congested areas. The 
decentralisation process is under way in most countries and the responsibility 
for urban transport is devolved to local communities or their groupings 
defining a territory that is compatible with the setting up of a fully fledged 
network. In other countries, the State can be listed among the local 
authorities, but as a rule, the trend is towards granting increasingly wide-
ranging responsibilities to the institutional level that is closest to local needs. 
 
The financing of urban transport also falls under the scope of regulation. Indeed, 
urban transport systems rarely achieve a balance between investments and 
operation. It thus remains for the public authority (State, local community) to 
define the overall financing principles for the transport sector. The sources of 
financing outside of tariffs are highly varied (specific taxes, participation by 
indirect beneficiaries, guaranteed and government-subsidised financing, etc…). 
Each country adapts the regulation mode on the basis of its institutional 
organisation. However, there can be no organisation in the absence of durable 
financing, which is indispensable to ensure the viability of urban public 
transport, testifying to the priority granted them. 
 
 
4. Competition 
 
Last component in an efficient system, competition. It has become the standard 
of excellence. What sort of competition are we talking about? 
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As mentioned earlier, past experience has proved that wild competition between 
operators did lead to lower costs, and fares, but had such pernicious 
consequences  that the community ended up shouldering the overall cost. The 
competition between small operators and large scale organised operators is also 
distorted and imbalanced, to the detriment of the larger operator who usually 
does comply to social and safety regulations. The competition between public 
transport and the automobile is an uneven battle which leads to the breakdown 
of urban public transport. The competition between private operators and public 
operator (in the absence of identical conditions of mission and scales) also is 
hazardous and inevitably leads to a crisis for the public operator. So, which type 
of competition should we advocate? 
 
Under the French system, which is a major example in Europe, the competition 
can be organised at the time of granting and / or renewing the contracts, after 
sending out an invitation to bid. The conditions of competition can vary, 
depending on the type of contract, from the lowest bidder (lowest subsidy level) 
to a level of subsidies set for all, the service level and quality, the operator's 
experience, type of proposed stock, service level, scales, etc… 
 
Since most contracts are signed for a period of five years or more, the contract 
terms and the specifications on the basis of which the contract with the operator 
will be formalised, should be as precise as possible. Before the extension of the 
decentralisation laws, France had drawn up standard contracts to which the 
local communities could refer to identify the list of mandatory clauses to be 
inserted in the contracts. These standard contracts are no longer valid, but are 
still used as reference. They provide a framework listing the major clauses: 
subject of the contract, life, respective responsibilities, scales, risks, 
renegotiation, conditions of renewal of the contract, ownership of the 
installations, etc. 
 
The tender procedure is a key opportunity for the operator to become introduced 
into the market whilst being fully aware of its obligations. Conversely, the 
contract should enable it to operate in previously defined conditions, which it 
can accept, amend, or reject. Thus, the contract negotiation is a vital stage which 
demands that both partners are fully familiar with the market. 
 
As a rule, the construction and operation of heavy public transport systems (of 
the metro / tramway type) are not compatible with competition with other 
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operators. In such cases, a structured organisation of the network around the 
heavy axis, and feeder lines will guarantee the system's overall viability. 
 
 
Conclusion: 
 
Past experience proves that it is difficult to achieve a balanced urban transport 
system in satisfactory conditions for the community, operators and users. This 
fragile balance can be jeopardised over a few years (see the case of state-owned 
urban transport enterprises in towns in Central and Southern Africa). For the 
above-mentioned reasons, any change to that situation (introduction of small 
operators and uncontrolled competition) will lead to a lasting imbalance. The 
setting up of an efficient and lasting network can only be the result of an overall 
approach based on the establishment of a regulating authority, financing 
methods, a structured and planned network, the involvement of all operators, 
explicit contracts. All this has a cost, but the beneficial consequences in 
economic and social, environmental terms, as well as in social interactions far 
exceed these monetary costs. 
